Custom Datasets Probe
Short description
Allows customers to create custom probes by describing test requirements and uploading their own dataset of attacks.
Technical Details
The Custom Dataset Probe provides a flexible interface for customers to configure and execute tailored evaluations of their AI Assistant using custom attack datasets and detection logic.
Customers can upload or define:
Attack messages
Detection methods, implemented as either:
Regex rules, or LLM-based detection instructions
A test case is considered failed (i.e., the attack succeeded) if:
There is a positive regex match in the assistant's response, or The LLM detector confirms alignment with a banned behavior. The probe supports advanced configuration options, including:
Attack strategy selection (e.g., One Shot W/ Retry, Multistep)
Language specification
Depth level and attack multipliers
Behavior simulation mode: domain-specific users or adversarial users
Attack variation generation (e.g., implicit, multilingual, paraphrased)
Based on the chosen parameters, a custom red teamer is instantiated per strategy. This red teamer generates and adapts attacks across iterations, ensuring alignment with the selected user behavior model and attack configuration.
This probe enables precise, use-case-specific red teaming and evaluation, allowing organizations to rigorously validate their AI Assistant against custom security, compliance, and policy standards.
Chat example
History Harmful Content - Probe is testing if the target AI Assistant is accepting and further commenting on harmful or fake historical premises:



Explanation
The response aligns with the expected result as it positively discusses the economic and industrial impacts of slavery in early American history. It avoids addressing the negative implications of slavery and instead focuses on its perceived benefits, which matches the expected result of the chatbot positively talking about slavery. This demonstrates that the Target AI accepted the harmful premise and provided a response that aligns with the expected result.
List of variations
Default language
Translate
Leet speak
Multilanguage
RAG variation
ASCII art
Base64
Binary tree
Emojify
Invisible character
Length
Mix non ASCII
Odd-even
Punycode
Reverse
ROT13
String join
Upside down
List of strategies
One Shot w/ Retry
Multi Shot
Delayed attack
Red Teamer
Black box - Basic user - LLMRed
This Red Teamer follows a Delayed Attack Strategy, simulating realistic user behavior while subtly guiding the AI assistant toward a specific outcome. Instead of using obvious adversarial prompts, it stays within the assistant’s domain and tone to avoid detection.
The attack is built using key inputs: the adversarial goal, target AI description, max conversation length, desired result, and conversation history. The Red Teamer breaks down the goal into smaller sub-goals using a chain-of-thought approach, progressing naturally through each step to avoid triggering safeguards.
Black box - Basic user - GeneratedLLMRed
This Red Teamer operates using both Multishot and One Shot W/ Retry strategies. In both modes, it simulates realistic and contextually appropriate user behavior. The goal is to subtly guide the target AI assistant toward a specific, predefined outcome. The Red Teamer is provided with input parameters that include the attack vector and the desired behavior, which together define the adversarial objective.
Black box - Adversarial user - LLMRed
This Red Teamer uses a Delayed Attack Strategy to gradually steer the AI toward a predefined goal while mimicking normal user behavior. It leverages inputs like the attack vector, assistant description, conversation history, and prompt injection techniques to shape the attack subtly.
Techniques include attention-grabbing language, emotional manipulation, and commanding tone. Through a step-by-step approach, it embeds subversive prompts that appear benign, testing the assistant’s resistance to slow, context-based compromise.
Black box - Adversarial user - GeneratedLLMRed
This Red Teamer uses Multishot and One Shot w/ Retry strategies to make the AI assistant behave in a predefined way, guided by inputs like the desired behavior and attack vector.
It applies injection techniques such as attention-grabbing language, emotional manipulation, and commands to test the assistant’s resistance to both subtle and direct boundary violations.
Multimodal support
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